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*(NOT IN
File on 30 Oct 80
Records Review)*

USAF review(s) completed.

NRO review(s) completed.

TAB

Mr. Knoche:

General Carter asked that you do a memo on the action item in para 5, and then I think he plans on showing this full memo only to certain interested people.

BLP



Whellon have seen the

DDCI memo
Bross too -

Done
Kirk has seen

STAT

NOTE FOR THE RECORD:

NO DISTRIBUTION WAS MADE OF THE
ATTACHED MEMO. DCI SAW IN DRAFT
FORM. DR. WHEELON,
AND MR. BROSS READ THIS COPY HERE
IN THE OFFICE.

BLP

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30 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 4:00 p.m., 27 January 1965

1. Present were Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Carter, Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.

2. The meeting opened with a general discussion of KEY-HOLE photography of the first package of 1016 and the inability to interpret exactly what the picture of the Soviet vent hole might mean. It was decided to wait for analysis of the second bucket of 1016 plus some possible KH-7 photography before taking any further action.



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4. General Carter reported on the results of the [redacted] flight as passed to him just prior to the meeting. No action was required and the matter was noted with interest. (Memo attached)

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5. Dr. Fubini then brought up the question of the [redacted] program as to security classification for briefings on the Hill in connection with the budget. Mr. McCone asked the cost of this project and

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Fubini told him it was

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No decision action was taken as to either of the two programs. I undertook to determine whether or not it was necessary to have anything other than a Secret classification for both projects since they did not involve overhead reconnaissance of denied areas. Fubini said this would help a great deal in the budget preparations if it could be done. Action: Dr. Wheelon, please take up with our Security people and make a recommendation on the security aspects. Also, please brief the Director and me on the current status of your discussions with Fubini on these systems in light of the foregoing remarks.

6. Mr. Vance then brought up the problem of discussing space and space systems on the Hill, especially when the questions involved payload. Mr. Vance stated that in appearing before Clint Anderson's Space Committee, there was considerable probing as to what was in the payloads and he, Mr. Vance, had ducked any responsive answer. General Carter stated that it would simplify our problems of security handling of payloads and contracting in this program if the United States Government would acknowledge that they were taking satellite photography. No action was taken.

7. There then followed a general discussion of the TITAN program, and Fubini stated that the TITAN III with an AGENA spacecraft would carry approximately 7200 pounds and that they called this the III-X AGENA. He stated that the TITAN III-C would

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carry 25,000 pounds and was the III-X without the AGENA but with three strapped-on boost assisters. For a polar launch it would carry only 19,000 pounds. Although it was not quite clear from the discussion, I got the distinct impression that if it had not already been done, the DOD was phasing out the TITAN II booster but not the missile for the TITAN II.

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17. Upon the departure of Dr. McMillan, General Carter told Secretary Vance that he, General Carter, was sorry if Secretary Vance had become upset or disturbed at General Carter's remarks. General Carter said that while Mr. Vance might consider the remarks intemperate, they were based on General Carter's judgment of the situation in the light of all facts available to him. General Carter stated that he felt Mr. Vance was not being adequately informed by his advisers, did not have either the full or true facts, and that the views put forward by McMillan and Fubini on which Mr. Vance was apparently basing his judgment were biased and not in the national interest.

18. Mr. Vance stated that at no time had he ever made a decision with a political bias and that everything he had ever done or said was, in his judgment, in the national interest. General

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Carter stated that he had always operated on the same principle.
The meeting ended on this most unhappy note.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MSC:blp

No distribution - DCI saw in draft.

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ADDENDUM #1 to M/R on Meeting w/Secty Vance - 21 Jan 65

I told Vance that I would like to have a statement on the appropriations provided in Fiscal '66 budget for all elements of the Intelligence Community, i.e., NSA, cryptological services, DIA, mapping, service intelligence units, NRO, etc. Vance expressed surprise that through John Bross's staff this information was not known to me. I pointed out that of the work done by Bross with the various units of the Intelligence Community, it had in effect produced figures which were claims on the final budget. However what was not known by Bross or anyone else was the manner in which these claims had been tailored to the final budget figure of [REDACTED]. Vance had no knowledge of the final answer and said that he would have Hitch develop the figures and review them with Bross and subsequently with me.

Vance said that he had received, but had not studied, my letter on the proposed schedule of overflights over Cuba which was the subject of a draft NSAM he and McNamara had prepared. I said that upon review I had concluded that the USIB requirement was about right and since it was met in December and January by less than 8 flights per month, which seemed to be about the frequency that the McNamara/Vance NSAM was aimed at, it was my personal view that the USIB requirements as established on November 25 should stand, but possibly be amended with respect to the 8 flight per month limitation. I pointed out that in some months when we run into bad weather this might have to be exceeded but this would have to be with authority from the Special Group. I said that if he and McNamara wanted the present requirement established by USIB reviewed, I would be glad to bring it up at an early USIB meeting if he so desired, but I felt it should stand for the reasons outlined. He said he would discuss this with McNamara and communicate further with me.

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mfb

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Copy # 1

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14 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO Ex Com Meeting, 1130 hours, Tuesday, 12 January,
in Secretary Vance's office

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, General Carter,
Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan

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2. This led Fubini into a discussion of drones and he indicated that an improvement package would be available in about six to eight months for the **BLUESPRINGS** drones which would increase its altitude to 60,000 feet as well as increasing its range and speed. He said that the drones cost [REDACTED] each. It was agreed that the project for improvement of the **BLUESPRINGS** drones would proceed immediately, that we would make as many feasible improvements as possible and go as far as we can to increase performance in order to get above the fighters. It was also agreed that two more C-130's would be modified as mother ships. There was a short discussion of the status of **TAGBOARD** but no decisions were required or made.

3. Mr. McCone stated that he had just had a cursory glance at the FY 66 budget, and, while he could not comment in detail on it at this time, he wanted to make sure that there was nothing in the budget or in his review of it that indicated a frozen commitment on an item-by-item basis. He was assured by Secretary Vance and Dr. McMillan that the budget was very flexible and could be adjusted at any time. It

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[REDACTED]

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was generally agreed that the budget was adequate and perhaps more than that. Mr. McCone said that if we get a reliable [redacted] we might not need as many [redacted] Fubini said that it was his understanding that McCone and Vance had agreed [redacted] and with an 80% confidence factor this required [redacted] Dr. McMillan stated that in order to get the wrinkles out of [redacted] and to get some real quality control into the program he had directed that [redacted] for the next six months and that experimentation with the [redacted] would be delayed for the next three months.

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4. Dr. McMillan stated, in response to Mr. McCone's question, that he had not looked at the [redacted] since November and he therefore could not report on developments, but that he was being briefed next week in full and would be able to report after that. He stated that the [redacted] and he contemplated reconvening the Land panel to make a formal review of the project. Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance both expressed their interest and stated that they intended to participate fully in this review.


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7. Dr. McMillan asked me to check on the since it was his understanding that the General Electric and Lockheed contracts with the Agency had not been modified to allow access for systems engineering. I stated that I would. (The present contracts which expire in March do include and will include them when renewed. The contracts which expire in August are being continued by letter which do not include but when formal contracts are negotiated will so include it. There has been no attempt, however, to exclude from information or access, the written contract is simply a formality. I asked Dr. Wheelon to inform Dr. McMillan accordingly.

8. There was no discussion of ARGON

9. Dr. McMillan stated that he had reviewed the proposed agreement and thought it was generally all right but might need clarifying. I told him I would sign it and send it over and hoped we could get on with it in a hurry.

*

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MSC:bec (14 Jan 65)

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Cy #5 - DD/S&T
Cy #6 - D/NIPE
Cy # 7 - Mr. Lundahl, D/NPIC
Cy # 8 - DD/I
Cy # 9 -

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4 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

Have reviewed your minutes of the NRO Executive Committee meeting and feel they are o.k. As you know, I signed the letter to Vance approving the establishment of a Study Group and Task Force on reconnaissance satellites with the caveat that I have not checked the terms of reference, but would do so and offer comments.

I think CIA should appoint very competent, objective men to both the Steering Group and the Task Force. What about Rod Scott? -- if this would not involve a conflict of interest. What I want to do is to put forth top men and then examine the credentials put forth by NRO, Air Force, etc.

I think the assignment of Lundahl is o.k. but it should be cleared out with Cline. The reason I brought this question up was to put a stop to McMillan's going directly to CIA staff people and not to their supervisors or superiors.

I have reviewed the McMillan communication on [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] but I think you should discuss this with Vance. What is
involved here, is an NRO decision approved by the Executive Committee
to initiate a program, money set aside and contracts let and then, all
of a sudden, McMillan and Fubini decide [redacted] and 25X1
therefore want to wash it out. They give no consideration, or even
think about, the fact that one of the basic parts of the study by three
competent contractors [redacted] I don't think 25X1
that they should turn this one off until we have at least fully explored
the subject.

But what is even more important, and you might tell this to
Vance, is that you and I this afternoon, [redacted] which is a totally 25X1
inadequate estimate because of lack of intelligence and the above-
mentioned project, if successful, will close the gap. [redacted] 25X1

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I think you
can make quite a point of this as it is one more example of the theory
that "two heads are better than one" -- so let's not cut off one head
at this stage of the game.

Dictated but not read by

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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2 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 3:30 on 1 December 1964

1. Present were Mr. Vance, Mr. McCone, General Carter, Dr. Fubini, and Dr. McMillan.

2. Mr. McCone opened the meeting by quoting appropriate excerpts from McMillan's proposed report to the President's Board in connection with management procedures for the NRO. Mr. Vance appeared visibly shaken and it was quite apparent he was not aware of the phraseology McMillan used. Vance agreed that he and Mr. McNamara had established NRO ExCom in an effort to improve management procedures and give necessary leadership, guidance, and support to Director, NRO. He pointed out that the report had been sent to Mr. McCone for review and had not yet been delivered to the President's Board nor had he personally read it. Mr. McCone stated that the views expressed by McMillan were diametrically opposed to two presentations he had made to the President's Board and if the report went forward in this form, he would be constrained to again present his views to the President's Board. Dr. Fubini questioned the appropriateness of either Vance or McCone reviewing the McMillan report and stated that he quite often disagreed with Vance and presented his views to the President's Board and others even when they were contrary to Vance's. Mr. McCone said that he knew of no requirement to clear the McMillan report with him or with Vance but certainly in the interests of Governmental operations at this level, it was a desirable thing to do. Mr. Vance stated his position unequivocally that the NRO Ex Com had served, and should continue to serve, as a very useful function and that McMillan should continue to look to it for his guidance. Mr. McCone agreed.

3. Dr. McMillan then brought up the [] message in connection with the review of photographic processing facilities around

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the world. He stated that Colonel Ohlmeier is the head of the processing facility at [] I am not quite sure why McMillan brought this subject up unless he thought it was controversial. I pointed out that we had agreed to go ahead with this review and, specifically, that any recommendations for changes should be processed to USIB for final approval since the intelligence community had primary interest in this matter. (This phraseology was used also in my letter of concurrence.) Dr. McMillan and the others agreed that this was a proper procedure.

4. McMillan then brought up message [] in which he proposes to test [] determine whether or not they have an operational capability and can qualify for the processing of KEYHOLE film from "womb to tomb." (Although this had given us some trouble initially, we have gone along with it.) I informed McMillan that we had gone along with this study and while we had made no commitment as to the allocation of resources for future use, we would expect any substantive changes between Eastman Kodak and [] to be thoroughly surfaced and discussed with us since we had a major responsibility in this area. There was no objection to this procedure.

5. McMillan then displayed the KH-4 mosaic of Cuba which indicates clearly that while it can be of some help in Cuban surveillance, it is a long cry from adequate surveillance to meet the needs of the intelligence community.

6. Mr. McCone pointed out that he had asked NPIC and the CIA staff to conduct a thorough review of our KH-4 photography capabilities to determine means of getting more information from it as well as comparing it with U-2 photography. In response to Mr. McCone's question as to the launcher to be set up at Cape Kennedy, McMillan stated that Mr. McNamara had said if Mr. McCone's provisos were met, he, McNamara, would go along with it. It appears, therefore, that DOD will establish a launching pad at Cape Kennedy although it has not yet been programmed.

7. General Carter then passed out the SKYLARK status report which did not generate any substantive discussion.

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8. Fubini then reported on some budget adjustments he had made with the Bureau of the Budget. (Please note that these were unilateral adjustments and apparently unknown to Vance and Mr. McCone.) Fubini said he reduced the [] drone purchase from twenty to fifteen and felt sure that this would not give CIA any trouble. He said they had transferred the 417 weather contract to a white contract and intended to make some savings in technical appliances connected therewith. [] He said they had knocked [] off []. This then brought up a discussion of just what the programming and funding status [] was. Dr. McMillan continued to be evasive and both Fubini and Vance expressed concern as to just where the program stood. Mr. McCone pointed out that he and Vance had agreed to go ahead on [] [] i. e., fund the developmental stage in the neighborhood of [] then take a good, hard look at it with the experts and determine whether to go forward []. Dr. Fubini was finally able to pin McMillan down to the fact that there were a number of checkpoints at which the [] program could be reviewed and decisions could be made on whether or not to proceed -- probably, however, suffering termination costs in the event of cessation. McMillan was directed to lay out a schedule of various points of development at which decisions can be made on proceeding or canceling. (We must be sure to follow up on this.) []

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10. Mr. McCone then referred to the proposed establishment of a steering group and a task force to look into overall reconnaissance requirements and plans as proposed in a letter from Vance to McCone and as already implemented by a message from McMillan. Mr. McCone stated his feeling that this task force, if organized, should not duplicate nor overlap studies and areas of responsibility of other Government agencies. He specifically mentioned USIB and COMOR. He referred to the fact that [redacted] [redacted] had already been turned over to contractors for development and that these two studies should not be included in the task force and steering group analysis and that research and development currently under way with contractors should not be disturbed. He said, therefore, that the terms of reference of the task force and the steering group needed to be revised to accord to his desires and he would look forward to seeing the proposed revisions. He also stated his concern that Director, NRO, was addressing invitations directly to Lundahl, the Director of NPIC, when Lundahl was in a chain of command which included Cline, Carter, and himself, Mr. McCone. Such invitations, he said, should therefore come to the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Vance pointed out his agreement to Mr. McCone's concerns. Dr. Fubini stated that this task force in fact had been generated by a JCS statement of military requirement for a quick reaction satellite, a requirement based on statements from SAC. The JCS wanted technical advice from the NRO as to whether or not this could be done and Dr. Fubini said he would try to let them know by February 1965. Dr. Fubini made it clear that the whole purpose of the steering group and task force was to address itself to this problem and Mr. McCone pointed out, in accordance with his draft letter, that there might well be other areas that the task force and steering group could look to in the overall interests of the reconnaissance program. (Mr. McCone should forward to Vance his written response as contained in the draft from which he read.) [redacted]

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11. Dr. McMillan reported on Table V - J-58 engine requirements and stated that Colonel Ledford and Colonel Geary were getting together to determine just what the requirements are and to come to an agreement on recommendations as to how we proceed.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

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16 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Next NRO ExCom Meeting

1. You and Secretary Vance agreed that the NRO '65 budget program would be discussed at next Tuesday's NRO ExCom meeting on 20 October.

2. You will recall that at the previous meeting on the '65 NRO budget you had available staff members to assist you, specifically Bross and Wheelon.

3. I cannot urge too strongly that you have Bross and Wheelon attend this upcoming meeting and that whatever other staff assistants, such as John Clarke or members of DD/S&T as may be necessary, also attend. You are entitled to the same budgetary advice as anyone else.

4. Attached is your memorandum of 23 July to McMillan on the '65 plan (Tab A), his response of August 14th (Tab B), Wheelon's comments of 25 August (Tab C). You will recall that Secretary Vance and I had agreed that we should continue the '65 budget presentations as soon as we were able to do so upon your return. This appears to be the first opportunity.

5. Specifically as regards Wheelon's memo of 25 August, my comments on the following numbered paragraphs are:

Paragraph 1: Agree

Paragraph 2: Agree

Paragraph 3: Restoration of funds to Program B is considered to be a major, unfinished problem.

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Paragraph 4: While Vance has agreed to sending the [redacted] organization to the West Coast, he has made no commitment to funding the contracting through Program B. This remains to be agreed.

Paragraph 5: I think this needs further technical analysis.

Paragraph 6: Agree

Paragraph 7: Agree

Paragraph 8: Agree. [redacted]

Paragraph 9: Agree

Paragraph 10: Needs considerably more information before you are in a position to comment.

Paragraph 11: This is a very fuzzy area for which we do not seem to be getting proper answers from NRO.


Paragraph 12: Agree. We have inadequate information upon which you can base a decision.

Paragraph 13: Agree

Paragraph 14: [redacted]

Paragraph 15: In view of SKYLARK and the extraordinary measures being taken in this program, I feel quite certain that the program funds will be inadequate.


Paragraph 16: While the conversion program has been agreed, I am not up to date on its progress. [redacted] is preparing a status report on this.



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Paragraph 17: No problem

Paragraph 18: As regards  the funding problem at the moment has been solved although the interference by McMillan in the managerial aspects remains a continuing problem.

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Paragraph 19: No comment

Paragraph 20: No comment


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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

* Dictated but not read by General Carter

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
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8. Dr. McMillan stated that the manner in which Wheelon was letting contracts without McMillan's prior approval prevented McMillan from conducting an objective review as well as injecting his own thinking into the projects. He added that this procedure also prevented the contractors from contributing anything such as new ideas into the program. He stated that this was a Wheelon project and that the contractors were inhibited in adding their talented contributions and thoughts to the basic idea.

9. General Carter stated that it was incomprehensible to him how five high-paid Government officials could be continually arguing about the precise management arrangements for a [redacted] program when other programs costing [redacted] [redacted] within the NRO had little if any supervision at all, especially from these officials.

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10. Mr. McCone stated his complete and total disgust with the entire NRO arrangements and especially with the arrogant intransigence of Dr. McMillan. He said he could not see how NRO could ever work properly with Dr. McMillan in charge of the program. He stated that Dr. McMillan's activities throughout their association had bordered on deceit in many instances. Dr. McMillan interjected that Mr. McCone had said this before in protecting his fair-haired boy Wheelon, and that Dr. McMillan had asked for such statements in writing. Mr. McCone stated that as far as he was concerned, the Department of Defense had reneged on the basic NRO agreement as well as subsequent agreements he had made in good faith with Vance, Fubini, and McMillan and that he, Mr. McCone, was thoroughly fed up with the whole procedure. There was no further comment and the subject was changed.

11. Mr. McCone distributed copies of the weekly SKYLARK report but no discussion ensued.

12. General Carter asked Dr. McMillan's assistance in getting some of the new fast film [redacted] so that the [redacted] could work on it [redacted] General Carter stated that [redacted] had been unable to get any of the film from [redacted] [redacted] He pointed out that the [redacted] technique depended in large measure on this fast film which was alleged to be 60% faster than anything presently in existence and perhaps might even have a factor of two to four times as great. He said while he could understand some reluctance on the part of [redacted] [redacted] because of proprietary interests, it should be noted that [redacted] is not in the film manufacturing business and that there could well be some other reason for failing to provide the film. Dr. McMillan stated that he was sure the only reason was that the film was not available in sufficient quantity but that he would look into it and see what could be done.

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
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14. The meeting then broke up in general disarray.

MSC/blp

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MSC:blp

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4. I stated that I had not seen the panel report on security but that if CIA members had agreed to it and as soon as I had checked it out in the Agency with my own Security people and if it gave me no problem, I was prepared to accept it. I stated, however, that this was not prejudging the merits of having Greer complete the three contracts in question. McMillan said he took a dim view of holding up projects on the basis of security when in fact security was not the matter questioned. I stated clearly for the record that, so far as I knew, the Director had not authorized any changes of any kind in the CORONA Program and that it had been agreed that no changes would be made without DCI approval. This included contracts as well as security procedures. I further stated that [] had telephoned me from Lockheed and I had reiterated this statement. [] confirmed that this was his understanding and this was the basis for a letter he had furnished McMillan. I stated that I had called McMillan and told him of my conversation with [] and that there should have been no misunderstanding. McMillan then quoted from a letter Greer had gotten from [] tending to substantiate McMillan's claim that Mr. McDonald, our contracting officer, had instructed [] not to sign the contracts. I stated I had not seen the letter but McDonald's instructions to Lockheed were identical with my instructions to [] and that it would pleasure me to get a copy of the [] letter. McMillan said he would furnish me a copy. McMillan then said that it was his clear understanding that taking [] on in the CORONA Program included adjustment of the systems integration and systems engineering contract with Lockheed so that it would be an Air Force contract. He stated that it involved nineteen people out of Lockheed and that the contract had previously been Air Force's but last year had been handled by [] All he wanted to do now was to get it back under Air Force auspices. McMillan said this was part and parcel of the [] function and he could not operate without it under Air Force auspices. I stated that I had no intention of authorizing this kind of contract without Mr. McCone's approval and, further, I had no intention of establishing the kind of CIA backstopping and input that had previously been agreed on the West Coast under these circumstances. I stated

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25X1 that participation in the CORONA Program was a two-way street and required not only clean intent but cooperation as well. I stated that I had no intention whatsoever of building up a CIA asset on the West Coast to leave it out in left field and that it was my clear understanding that we had agreed to consolidate the CIA assets under [] to have a definite and clear-cut input into the CORONA Program across the boards and, specifically, to cover the entire payload which was CIA responsibility. Fubini interjected at this point to indicate that I was welching on a prior agreement and that the understanding was purely to send one or two men to the West Coast to work with Greer's organization to learn more about the program and increase their competence. I refused to accept the word "welching" and required him to withdraw it which he did threefold. McMillan stated that it was his understanding that I was to develop a plan by which [] and others would go to the West Coast. I stated that I had such a plan but the Director had left in such a hurry on his trip that I had not had time to clear it with him; that as soon as he returned I would develop the full particulars and inform the Executive Committee of what we plan to do. I reiterated that I was not prepared to establish a group on the West Coast to "watch the parade go by," but that they would have full responsibility for all security and all contracting presently handled by CIA and, in addition, they would sign off on and deliver a complete payload to the agency responsible for tying it into the booster and firing it. In addition, they would follow along throughout the entire process to ensure that the marriage was properly consummated. I stated that I was not reneging on Mr. McCone's prior reluctant acceptance of the majority view to have [] in the act although we were still of the opinion it was a bad idea. I stated that I was not agreeing to the Stellar Index Camera changes at this time because my main concern was the collection of intelligence and that we had had a remarkably successful CORONA Program throughout the months since May. It was my understanding that the changes proposed for SIC would probably not be effective until late next spring and that they were designed primarily to augment a military mapping program. Fubini confirmed this and I said I was not prepared to take the risk of messing up a good intelligence collection program until our technicians and

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experts had fully signed off on the new proposals as being totally feasible and in keeping with intelligence collection. McMillan said he had written in June of 1963 to Greer and Ledford, telling them to get on board this program and work jointly on it and that CIA had had every opportunity to be a full participant in the new program but had been uncooperative throughout. I reiterated my position that I was not here to indulge in vituperation and histrionics but I was here to protect the interests of the intelligence community and I was not convinced that this type of activity would so protect it.

25X1 5. Vance asked me to take a look at the panel report on security handling of the contracts at the Advanced Projects Area and if this gave me no problem, to see if I could not go along with the systems integration transfer to Lockheed as an Air Force contract and the small [] hardware contract. I told him if it did not involve the payload (which nobody seemed to know), I would discuss it with my people and see if it gave us a problem. McMillan said it was his belief that it did not in any way involve the payload but was purely the systems engineering of tying the payload into the booster. However, he was not sure of this and would have to check it himself. As can be seen from the foregoing, the discussion was relatively inconclusive and I made no commitments except to look at the problems in the light of this discussion. Action: DD/S&T to advise me so that we can thoroughly clue in Mr. McCone prior to any other meetings. Also, advise me as to any agreements we have made on security handling in connection with the panel report mentioned by Dr. McMillan. Also, to get the copy of the Lockheed letter and analyze it as to facts. It is perfectly apparent that NRO and McMillan are keeping very close book on all of the CIA actions and responses to their requests.

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7. Dr. McMillan handed me an envelope containing a copy of the memorandum to Dr. Wheelon reference [redacted] I asked if I should read it now or take it back with me. Mr. Vance said it did not make any difference since it had already gone. This indicates clearly that McMillan's memo to Wheelon was cleared in advance by Vance. I did not read it at the table but merely took the envelope. Action: DDCI to talk to DCI. This again throws in the gauntlet on how DCI intends to operate the [redacted] DD/S&T to prepare briefing memo for DCI

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with particular reference to the memo signed by Mr. McCone directing DD/S&T in specific detail how they were to conduct the program.

25X1 8. I distributed copies of the 28 September report on SKYLARK status. There was no particular discussion except Fubini pointed out on the page of "Decisions" that items 3 and 10 might be construed as indicating that authority for the use of electronic countermeasures had been obtained whereas in fact none existed. I told them that a COMOR estimate had indicated the necessity of making from three to six flights monthly throughout the next calendar year to get the same general coverage of the U-2's as required by USIB, and that this would total 53 successful flights from November through October.

25X1 10. During the conference Mr. Sylvester asked Mr. Vance for permission to send Pentagon-accredited foreign press to the demonstration at Edwards. After some discussion, he and I agreed this would be all right.

11. I discussed the subject of [redacted] with Mr. Vance and he agreed that we should go ahead and fly them without

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/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

MSC:blp

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- Copy 5 - ER via Executive Director
- Copy 6 - EA/DDCI

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11 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting at 3:30 p.m., on Thursday,
10 September

PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Secretary Vance, Dr. McMillan,
and General Carter

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1. The meeting opened with distribution to each member of a copy of "SKYLARK Status Report for Week Ending 4 September." Each member read the entire report thoroughly and questions were asked and answered by those present. Great interest was shown in the report.

[REDACTED]
It was also agreed that Kelly Johnson should be informed that the Executive Committee of NRO laid great stress on this project and was following it closely on a weekly basis through the SKYLARK weekly reports. Action: DD/S&T to follow up on the above two requirements and report results.

2. The future U-2 program was then discussed and it was generally agreed that the best solution to the problem would be to modify existing SAC aircraft on a reasonable turn-in basis without establishing a crash production line -- say on the basis of modifying four per year. It was also agreed that we should see whether or not some other contractor was in a position to do the work on a much cheaper basis than Lockheed. Both of these agreements are to be considered in a plan to be submitted by Colonel Ledford. This plan is to develop a schedule of modifications and estimated completion dates and to include a listing of the actual modifications required. The general consensus was that modifying to U-2H was probably as far as we should go. Action: Colonel Ledford to prepare such a plan and show it to

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General Carter prior to any further action with the NRO Executive Committee. Action: The charts used by Colonel Ledford at the prior briefing were supposed to have been reproduced, at my direction, on 8 x 10 sheets and provided all members of the Executive Committee. Mr. Vance was provided some sort of photographic copy about 3 x 4 inches, and these were not satisfactory. I gave him the book of 8 x 10 reproductions provided me by DD/S&T and he retained that book. I want to know why my instructions were not complied with, and soon.

3. Dr. McMillan then briefed on the problems causing the [redacted] and indicated that they centered around command and control instructions being reliably received -- apparently electrical malfunctions of some sort. The latest date [redacted]

[redacted]

5. Dr. McMillan reported that he did not yet have signatures of all members of the Land Committee on the Land report but that it was generally encouraging as to the prospects for [redacted] Certainly he was all ready to proceed on a Phase I type of operation, and it was agreed that when the final Land report was submitted, Dr. McMillan would review it and report to the Executive Committee prior to going ahead with any big program.

6. Mr. McCone then reported that in following up on suggestions made at previous meetings of the Executive Committee, a plan had been developed to establish a small CIA element to assist General Greer by having this element co-located with General Greer and conduct CIA CORONA activities on the West

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Coast. Mr. McCone said he contemplated having []
[] in place in several weeks to be in charge of the CIA
operations. [] in addition to being the head of the
[] would also provide a single point
of contact for Greer and for Washington on CIA CORONA
matters. He would provide advice and guidance to General
Greer, would be responsible for all CIA contracting and all
CIA security responsibilities. In addition, he would control the
[] All of this was designed to give a single
cohesive input to the CORONA program from the CIA and to
revitalize our participation in that program. []
~~report to and be responsible to~~ General Greer, ~~and would~~ *be*
~~authorized to communicate~~ have direct lines of communication back to the DD/S&T here in
Washington so that he could obtain additional advice, guidance,
and assistance from our Headquarters competence as might be
needed. We might augment [] by the assignment of
a couple of additional technical people at a later date. Mr. McCone
pointed out that the successful operation of this plan required a
clear-cut understanding of the Executive Committee as well as
clear-cut instructions to Greer. I stated that these instructions
should include participation of the CIA in all contractor/supplier
meetings, a satisfactory working relationship with []
[] who now has a systems engineering role, and a firm
position in the Configuration Control Board or whatever new
coordination mechanism is established for the system. Mr. Vance
and Mr. McCone agreed that the veto concept of the Configuration
Control Board was not working properly and that the Control Board,
~~whenever it was not in agreement, should present its conflicting~~ *act as an advisory*
~~views to General Greer for decision (and in the event these are~~ *board*
~~major problems, such decision might have to be made back at the~~
~~Washington level.)~~ All of these points seemed to be agreed by
everyone present but it was decided that I would prepare a memo
for Dr. McMillan establishing the working relationships as we see
them and proposing the type of guidance General Greer should
receive from Dr. McMillan. Such a memo is being prepared and
I will furnish the Executive Committee copies of it. Action:
General Carter to prepare appropriate memo. *(used to review this)*

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7. Mr. McCone then brought up the problem of competing contracts being negotiated by General Greer [redacted]

[redacted] He specifically mentioned [redacted] along the lines of the Wheelon memo. Dr. McMillan indicated that he may have been responsible for Greer's actions and that Greer may have misunderstood his instructions. Mr. McCone said that a senior executive of [redacted] whom he knew personally, had telephoned him inquiring as to a proposed contract with Greer which appeared to be in direct competition with a CIA program [redacted]

[redacted] Dr. McMillan said he was not aware of this facet of the contract and would look into it right away. Mr. McCone pointed out that we had already contracted for a backup study [redacted]

[redacted] and that while he was always one to encourage the greatest diversity in think projects in order to ensure success, he thought it put the Government in an untenable position when two separate agencies were negotiating on contracts designed to downgrade proposals of the other agency. He said he would like to have this gone into thoroughly by Dr. McMillan and reported back to the next Executive Committee meeting. Action: None required by CIA until McMillan reports back.

8. There was general discussion of the USIB actions at the morning meeting same date, particularly with regard to the crisis satellite. Nothing new was added that had not already been discussed at USIB. Both Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance thought that perhaps we were looking at the same target too often in the Soviet Union and Dr. McMillan confirmed that he had the same impression. In other words, we should be careful that COMOR was not getting into a repetitive rut, doing the same thing over and over again with inadequate imagination as to new areas, new targets, and frequency of observation. Action: [redacted] please take a look at this and give me an informal memo.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

*Dictated but not read by General Carter

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1 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO Ex Com Meeting, 3:00 to 4:00 p.m., 1 September

Present were: Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Carter, Dr. McMillan, and Dr. Fubini

1. Colonel Ledford, the Director of Program B of the NRO, presented to the Committee his views on the upcoming requirements for U-2's for overhead reconnaissance of denied areas as a responsibility of the CIA. He also compared the operational capabilities of the U-2 with those of the A-12. (The charts for this briefing are to be reproduced in miniature -- 8 x 10 -- and provided to the members of Ex Com). There was considerable clarifying discussion without major decision.

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Mr. McCone expressed the opinion that we should undertake a conversion program rather than establishing a new production line and this appeared to be generally agreed by all. No decision was taken however, because Mr. Vance wished to review the charts at greater length, particularly the one on cost and capabilities of the various U-2 types and the one on possible options. It was agreed to review the matter at the meeting next week and probably take decision then.

ACTION: Colonel Ledford to reproduce and distribute the charts as soon as possible and prepare any recommendations for my use for the meeting next week.

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2. Mr. Vance then brought up the subject of CORONA contracting, and pointed out that there had been a misunderstanding as between the meeting of August 11th and the meeting of August 26th concerning transfer of contracting responsibility for CORONA, but that he thought this misunderstanding had been cleared up by the exchange of correspondence between himself and General Carter. Mr. McCone then stated that the problem was much more basic than the simple transfer of contract responsibility. He said he had expressed himself in prior memoranda to Mr. McNamara and to ^{McCone} ~~Mr. McNamara~~ on organizational changes of the NRO as proposed by the President's Board, and that he was firm in the positions stated therein. He felt that the NRO organization was basically wrong and that it created impossible situations when an official of one agency was placed in the position of giving orders to and directing subordinate echelons of another agency. He said that his experience in the AEC had shown that this would not work. On the other hand, it worked perfectly when an agency head had overall responsibility for a program and was able to task other agencies as complete entities for portions of that responsibility. He said, therefore, that the NRO should be organized so that the CIA with its competence could be tasked for certain responsibilities and that the Air Forces with its competence (particularly the Systems Command) could be tasked for other responsibilities. He stated that obviously the authority must accompany responsibility. He said that the NRO with a staff of [redacted] and General Greer, on the West Coast, with a staff of perhaps [redacted] could not possibly match in depth and competence the tremendous assets of General Schriever's Systems Command, and that these were not being used in the national interest of the intelligence collection program. Mr. McCone then said that he would propose no changes in any of our existing procedures unless and until the entire NRO organizational concept was worked out properly. Mr. Vance said that while he did not agree with ~~that~~ Mr. McCone's management concepts he was prepared to continue the CORONA contracting procedure as presently established if this was Mr. McCone's firm desire. Mr. McCone ^{agreed} ~~agreed~~ that it was and it was therefore agreed that the contracting responsibilities would remain as currently assigned. Dr. McMillan stated that if he could give Greer all contracting authority for CORONA he would probably cut the cost of the program by [redacted]. He stated that he would reluctantly accept the decision [redacted].

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[redacted] Mr. McCone and I agreed to this and Mr. McCone stated that in accordance with the Vance suggestion of last week [redacted]

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(After the meeting, Mr. McCone directed me to take these actions

He said he wanted to enter this newly developing phase with complete and total objectivity and to provide the greatest possible assistance to the CORONA program.)

ACTION: I have already discussed this matter with DD/S&T and they will present me a first draft of a plan by 2:00 p.m. tomorrow for discussion with Mr. McCone prior to his departure.

3. Mr. McCone reported that as a result of his directive of August 14 to Dr. Wheelon and my following directive of 27 August which he had approved, Dr. Wheelon had prepared his comprehensive plan of action for [redacted]. He said that in keeping with his responsibilities for keeping the NRO Ex Com informed, he herewith handed over to each Ex Com member a copy of the plan he had approved for [redacted]. These were handed out but not read at the meeting.

4. Upon being asked by Mr. McCone when the Land report [redacted] would be ready, Dr. McMillan stated he had received it this afternoon and that Land had asked him to get the signatures of the other Panel members on it. Until this was done, he did not feel free to give the report any general distribution but said he would furnish Mr. McCone a copy for his information as soon as he got back to his office.

5. Mr. McCone reported on the OXCART directive for a SKYLARK capability by early November and stated that he had arranged for a weekly report so that the NRO Ex Com would be kept currently advised of progress.

ACTION: DD/S&T to prepare this report for presentation each week.

6. As Mr. McCone was leaving the meeting, he reminded Dr. Fubini to read and absorb the two memoranda to which he had referred earlier, with a possible view to discussing them at the meeting next week. Dr. Fubini held up the [redacted] papers and said, "Do you mean these?" Mr. McCone replied, "No, I mean my memoranda to the President and to McNamara; those you have there are already approved."

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6 - D/NIPE

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27 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NRO ExCom Meeting of 26 August

1. Present were Secretary Vance, myself, Dr. Fubini, and Mr. Kiefer. Both Fubini and Vance had left a speech-writing meeting in order to hold the NRO ExCom meeting which lasted one hour.

2. Vance asked me if there was any unfinished business that we needed to discuss other than the FY '65 and '66 budgets.

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[redacted] He felt that most of the NRO problems could eventually be solved by this type of informal discussion between Vance and McCone. I agreed in part but pointed out that the major problem with NRO was the attitude and the frustrations to the Agency that had been built up over the past several years, and a change in these relationships would not occur overnight. Vance agreed and said we should work toward these objectives.

3. I pointed out to Vance that the response from McMillan to Mr. McCone's budget memorandum clearly indicated the need for additional briefings for Mr. McCone, myself, and our advisers and that before proceeding with the remainder of the program, these briefings should be held. Vance agreed but asked specifically if there was anything on the budget that we might discuss today. I pointed out that if CIA is going to continue to contract for the CORONA payload, then funds should be available since present funds cover only the contracts that terminate in September and October of '64. Fubini stated that at previous meetings Mr. McCone had reluctantly agreed that since the majority wanted [redacted] as Systems Manager for CORONA, he had reluctantly gone along with it but pointing out his distaste

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for the procedure. Fubini said that the whole package for this exercise included the transfer of contracting responsibility to Greer and that was why the money had not been allocated to Program B. I stated that I felt it was essential that the high competence in satellites and missilery which the Agency has established be utilized in all pertinent NRO programs. Fubini denied that we had the competence, especially on the West Coast, and stated that to all intents and purposes the Agency was already out of the CORONA program. Kiefer reviewed the Coordination Board activities and Vance pointed out that this was an unsatisfactory arrangement for him and he wanted one individual who could be responsible to him and to Mr. McCone for a complete program. He thought that this should be Greer and that if it required Greer to do the contracting as well, then Greer should do it. Upon being questioned by Vance, Fubini pointed out that it was not absolutely necessary to transfer the contracting to Greer although it was probably neater to do so.

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4. Mr. Vance read from a memorandum for record dated 12 August by McMillan in which McMillan stated that Mr. McCone's agreement on accepting [REDACTED] as Systems Manager also

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included the contract changes as proposed in McMillan's original package. This was all news to me and I told Mr. Vance I would have to check it out with my records and with Mr. McCone. (See subsequent actions in this regard.) I stated also that I would take a look at the proposal to send personnel from the Agency out to be advisory to Greer.

5. I then mentioned that we continue to have problems as between the allocation of responsibility from NRO to Eastman Kodak and Westover, particularly since there appears to be a steadily increasing workload on Eastman Kodak while we are required to hold them to a fixed personnel ceiling. I said that this is a problem that must be resolved and that we would not be satisfied with budget allocations as indicated by NRO until we were satisfied that a delineation of workload and responsibilities was agreed by Mr. McCone. Dr. Fubini pointed out that, much to his horror, SAC was building a very fancy system for processing R-12 photography and that it had gone so far before he knew about it that he could not stop it. I made no comment.

6. I then stated that a decision must be made very soon as to whether we are going to convert SAC U-2's to CIA modifications for the CIA inventory or whether we were going to purchase U-2L's. Vance said he had already made the decision to replace SAC U-2's with RB-57's [redacted] and that as far as he was concerned these U-2's should be modified to meet CIA needs. However, he said that what we needed first was a requirements study to indicate just what the needs were and that he had heard many varying figures. I pointed out that before we made the final decision on conversion or new production, I wanted the committee to hear the analysis we have made on this matter both as to requirements and as to costs and availabilities. Vance agreed to have this presented at the meeting next Tuesday and thought that it should also include consideration of the A-12 fleet. This meeting is tentatively set for Tuesday morning and I charged DD/S&T (OSA) with preparing an up-to-date briefing on this matter.

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8. I then referred to the letter that I had sent Mr. Vance reference speed trials using 121 or 129 and he agreed that from what I had said, this proposal would not work. In this connection, Fubini seemed miffed that Vance had not clued him in on my letter. I then told Vance that I was taking necessary action to ensure that the highest priority activities of the entire OXCART system would be placed on achieving an operational capability with four aircraft at mach 2.8/80,000 feet, refueling in flight, and operating entirely from [REDACTED] and that nothing else in the program would be allowed to interfere with meeting this requirement. Vance agreed and Fubini pointed out that we should not be too arbitrary on the 2.8 mach since Kelly Johnson had told him he was having difficulty making this figure with that number of aircraft.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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